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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the performance of the Navy's
Overseas Screening Policy for 1989, with specific emphasis on
determinina how n-- --m-rncl were return~ed to t'- U. Z. pi
to the end of their tour. Overseas screening in its present
form is the result of 16 years worth of development. The
purpose of screening is to avoid sending service members
overseas with problems that cannot be handled by the overseas
command. The data collected for this thesis included
information on personnel incarcerated overseas,
administratively discharged while overseas, medically
evacuated from overseas, and those returned at the request of
an overseas command. Estimates made from the data showed that
the number of early returns is much larger than previously
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I. INTRODUCTION
Overseas duty is different from stateside duty in many
ways. Aside from the obvious differences in culture and
environment, there are many aspects of overseas duty that
affect the quality of life for the service member and his/her
family. The cost of living in such places as Japan or Europe
is generally higher than stateside locations such as San Diego
or Norfolk. On-base services such as commissary and exchange
facilities are likely to be less extensive than those on
stateside bases, service members may not have the same access
to needed hospital services at overseas stations as they do in
the U.S., and the availability of assistance for family-
related problems is limited.
Because of these differences, the Navy carefully screens
personnel designated for overseas duty. The purpose of the
screen is to identify existing and/or potential problems that
may be exacerbated by the conditions inherent in duty
overseas, and to keep sailors with these problems from being
sent overseas. The overall aim of the policy is to reduce the
likelihood that a service member will end up at a foreign duty
station with a problem that may necessitate his or her return
to the U.S. prior to the end of the scheduled tour.
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A. PROBLEM
A small percentage of those who go overseas do not
complete their tours. For some, the reasons are purely for
the convenience of the government (for example, the billet is
deleted, the member is needed elsewhere, etc.); therefore,
personnel falling in this category will not be included in the
present analysis. For others, problems arise while overseas
that exceed the capacity of the services available at the area
command, such as medical or dental conditions that cannot be
treated at the overseas hospital. These cases are also
outside the scope of this study. Some, however, arrive at
their overseas duty station with a pre-existing problem that
could have been detected had the member been screened
properly. For example, some members/dependents are sent with
medical conditions that require stateside treatment,
financial problems that are only made worse by the cost of
relocating, or family problems, which are magnified when the
family is faced with the additional challenge of assimilating
into a foreign culture.
Substantial costs are incurred when screening is not done
properly. Not only does the overseas command have to pay the
direct costs of returning a member, it also may incur many
indirect costs, e.g., the loss of productive man-hours from
the member, losses involved with an unfilled billet (as may
occur when there is a delay in getting a replacement for a
returntd member), :n- ?verse effects on the morale and
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productivity of the command. The member also incurs both
direct and indirect costs associated with an unplanned
relocation: additional moving costs above what is paid by the
Navy, possible negative effects on the career, and added
strain on family life.
This group causes unnecessary hardships for the overseas
commands and hospitals and puts an additional burden on base
support facilities. From figures provided by the Overseas
Screening Office at the Naval Military Personnel Command
(NMPC-662), 17,775 enlisted sailors were sent overseas in
fiscal year 1989. Of that number, 144 were returned at the
request of an overseas command, with projected direct costs of
approximately $2 million [Ref. 1].
The issue of early returns has received considerable
attention since 1975 when the cost of early returns from
overseas assignments was reported to be in excess of $6
million [Ref. 2]. While this number was admitted to be a very
conservative estimate (for example, it omitted any of the
indirect costs described earlier), it has been the driving
force behind much of the subsequent effort aimed at improving
screening.
Another reason overseas screening has received attention
in recent years is related to diplomatic relations. U.S.
negotiators involved in sensitive talks with foreign
governments about the future of overseas bases, such as the
'hilippines, are intcreztcd in avoiding any ernL-rasbing or
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politically damaging incidents by the members of the Armed
Forces stationed overseas. In a message to all Naval commands
in 1988, the Chief of Naval Operations remarked that "When the
overseas screening process fails, embarrassment to the United
States, personal hardship, and unwarranted burden on
commands... frequently result." [Ref. 3] Anticipated budget
cuts will require even greater emphasis on proper screening to
ensure that scarce resources are not wasted on members who
should never have been sent overseas.
B. OBJECTIVES
In a 1990 letter to the Superintendent of the Naval
Postgraduate School from Rear Admiral (RADM) Hazard, the
Director of the Pride, Professionalism and Personal Excellence
Division of the Navy, (which controls the Overseas Screening
Department), it was requested that the screening policy be
evaluated in terms of service members and families returned
from overseas, and the reasons ZoL their retirn. The nrimary
objective of this study, therefore, is to provide a complete
assessment of the effectiveness of the overseds screening
program. There are two parts of this assessment. The first
requires determining the total number of early returns from
overseas commands. These early returns include 144 members
that were returned at the request of an overseas command, for
reasons !'!vh as financial problems, family problems, and
alcohol abuse. In addition, these early returns must include
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those that were returned as a result of administrative
discharges, incarcerations, and medical evacuations. Members
failing into these last three categories also represent early
returns, but because they are not handled through the same
channels as the requested returns, they are not included with
the 144.
The second part of the assessment involves deLermining
how many of those early returns were for reasons that could
have been detected in a proper screen i.e., the failure rate
of the program. The study group consists of all those who
received orders for overseas duty in 1989. The results will
be used to provide an objective measure of the success rate,
to cornp re 1989 performance to that in 1980. The 1980 study
contains the most recent figures available on the performance
of the program, and should therefore provide the baseline from
which to determine if there has been any improvement. Also
1:89 and 1980 data are used to estimate the total average
costs of returning members early during the study period. The
results of this analysis will enable the Overseas Screening
Department to better monitor the program, and more accurately
determine total return and replacement costs.
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II. BACKGROUND
The goal of screening is to minimize the chance of
sending a member overseas with a problem that cannot be
handled by the overseas command. To achieve this goal, there
are procedures in place to investigate reports of major
deficiencies from overseas commands, to provide continuing
feedback to the commands ptforming screenings, and to
continually update the forms and instructions to ensure that
current issues are being dealt with adequately. Overseas
screening in its present form is the result of 16 years worth
of devclopment.
A. THE PROCESS
NMPC issues a member overseas orders, which specify that
an overseas screen must be conducted on the individual and his
dependents within 30 days of receipt of those orders. Upon
completion of the screen by the transferring command, they
must send a message to NMPC indicating whether the
member/family were found suitable or not (and if not, why).
Naval Military Personnel Command Enlisted Distribution
Department (NMPC-40BB) then makes a decision to either accept
the finding of unsuitability and cancel the orders, or, in
isolated instances, to send the member overseas in spite of
the finding.
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When a member arrives at an overseas duty station,
his/her records are reviewed by that command. If a screening
deficieicy is found at this point, the command is instructed
to notify NMPC and the member's previous command of the
problem. Three reasons for screening deficiencies are: (1)
failure of the member's command to ensure that the relevant
policies and instructions are followed correctly, (2) failure
of the local medical command to adhere to written procedures,
and (3) failure of the member to disclose information that
could have an adverse effect on their chances of going
overseas.
Another office in the Enlisted Distribution Department
(NMPC-462) reviews the deficiency report and makes a
determination as to whether the problem is a minor one
(signatures missing on the document, for example), or a major
one (such as the member arriving 4ith a medical condition not
treatable at the overseas location), and then requires the
screening command to explain how the deficiency occurred and
how such problems will be prevented in the future.
If a screening deficiency is serious enough to warrant
requesting that the member be returned, this request goes
directly to NMPC-40BB. In addition, if at any time during the
overseas tour, the member's command determines him to be
unsuitable for further overseas duty, a message requesting
that the member be returned early is sent to NMPC-40BB. This
office then makes the decision to return the member or not.
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NMPC-662, as Program Director for Overseas Screening, monitors
the process through data collected from NMPC-462 and NMPC-
40BB, then makes their own assessments based on that data, and
compiles statistics that are used to evaluate the program.
In addition to the members that NMPC-40BB decides to
return early, there are at least three other groups of
personnel who do not complete their overseas tours as
scheduled. These include:
.) Those who receive administrative discharges from the
Navy. This does not include members who have merely
reached the end of their obligated service.
2) Those members who are incarcerated in Navy overseas
brigs, and are subsequently released to a foreign prison
or returned to the states.
3) Those members who have to be returned to the states for
medical (or dental) reasons, and who do not return to
complete their overseas tour.
These three groups represent potentially large numbers of
early returns. They also represent possible screening
failures, but it is not standard practice to review their
screening status, and as a result they never come to the
attention of the Overseas Screening Office (NMPC-662).
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B. HISTORY
Prior to 1974, the formal process of screening personnel
for overseas duty was practically non-existent. Realizing
this, the Navy conducted a baseline assessment of the program
[Ref. 2]. The product of that study was entitled "Task Order
75/53/B, Assessment of the Screening Problem for Overseas
Assignment," and the results presented therein were nothing
short of astonishing. Fewer than nine percent of the
personnel they gathered records on (those ordered overseas
during 1974) had been screened. There was an instruction
governing screening, BUPERS (Bureau of Navy Personnel)
Instruction 1300.26E; however, this merely directed commanding
officers to determine for themselves whether a member should
be sent overseas, and there was no checklist of items to
screen for. The estimated number of members returned for
reasons that could have been detected in a proper screen was
1,665, or more than six percent of the total sent overseas.
An extremely conservative estimate of the costs associated
showed them to be in excess of $6 million.
The Navy responded to this glaring policy gap, and
"the overseas screening and selection system was
subsequently examined and thoroughly revised. The
new system was first implemented at the major
service schools, and on April 8, 1977, BUPERS
NOTICE 1300 was issued to promulgate the system
throughout the Navy. Since that time, the system
has been formally incorporated onto the Enlisted
Transfer Manual." [Ref. 4]
In 1980 a follow up study was conducted to see if any
improvements had occurred in the years since the 1975 study.
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The results of this effort were more encouraging. Early
returns of those sent overseas were down to an estimated 1.1
percent and related costs had been reduced to roughly $2
million [Ref. 4]. Questions remained, however, when it was
revealed that only 56 percent of those in the study group
(those ordered overseas in 1979) had been screened.
Difficulties in obtaining complete information from all of the
related offices also lead the researcher to make some dubious
assumptions about prior-detectability of reasons. For
example, in the case of administrative discharges it was often
unclear what the reason for discharge was. Because of this,
the researcher had to make a decision whether the problem was
one that could have been detected earlier, and it was not
always clear what this decision was based on. Nonetheless,
using the same basic methods that were used in the 1975 study,
and generating the same kinds of numbers, the study showed the
program was indeed working and was saving the Navy several
million dollars.
In 1984, a theory of "cross-cultural adaptability"
proposed that one way to reduce the problems Navy personnel
and their families were encountering overseas was to focus on
their ability to adjust to foreign environments [Ref. 5].
Instead of merely screening out those with debt problems, or
poor disciplinary records, it was suggested that the focus
should be on the member's attitude toward living and working
overseas. Typical areas to be addressed in this new method of
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screening included "interpersonal harmony," "self
confidence/initiative," and "trust in people."
Cross cultural adaptability screening was never adopted
perhaps because the '-vy may have felt the costs of
implementing it were prohibitive [Ref. 4]. It is also
possible that because this type of screen would =,-uire
trained psychologists to administer, and because it was more
"touchy-feely" than existing procedures, it was dropped from
consideration. After all, they are called "orders," not
"invitations."
About the same time, however, continued complaints from
overseas commands, as well as continued dollar losses
associated with early returns, made the Navy realize that
there was a need for a governing instruction to formally
address everyone involved with the program. The previous
guidelines did not adequately deal with all of the various
issues involved nor did they lay out the responsibilities for
the personnel conducting the various aspects of the screening
process. (BUPERS NOTICE 1300, being only a notice, was not a
permanent solution.) Evidence of this was first seen in a
paper entitled "Planning Resource Guide For The Development Of
An OPNAVINST For Overseas Suitability Screening", coordinated
by NMPC-662 in June 1985. The result of this work was
OPNAVINST 1300.14. This is the overall guidance for the
program, which in general terms defines the areas of
responsibility of all those involved in screening. More
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specific guidance on aLeas identified in the OPNAVINST are
dealt with in the following documents:
-- Naval Military Personnel Manual, section 6810105,
which deals with command sponsorship of dependents
overseas.
-- Officer Transfer Manual (OTM), chapter three, which
deals with the specific guidelines for screening officers
for overseas duty.
-- Enlisted Transfer Manual (ETM), chapter four, which
deals with the same guidelines discussed in the OTM,
except it deals with enlisted only.
--Naval Medical Command Instruction (NAVMEDCOMINST)
1300.1C, which "provides procedures for medical and
dental evaluation during suitability processing for
overseas assignment of Navy members and their
accompanying dependents."
--NAVMEDCOMINST 6320.22, which "establishes guidance
for operation of the Family Advocacy Program (FAP) at
medical treatment facilities (MTFs) and dental treatment
facilities (DTFs)."
--NMPC Instruction 1720.1B, "Information Concerning
Overseas Living Conditions."
--NAVMED Form 1300/1. This is the actual checklist to
be used by medical and dental commands for conducting
overseas screening.
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--NAVPERS Form 1300/16. "Report of Suitability For
Overseas Assignment." This is the actual checklist to be
used by the transferring member's command.
--OPNAVINST 1754.2. "Exceptional Family Member (EFM)
Program," guidance that mandates that sponsors with EFMs
be assigned only to those overseas areas where their EFMs
specialized needs could be met.
The focus of the screening policy in the years between
1985 and the present has been characterized by keeping the
policy and personnel involved in screening up-to-date with the
issues, such as FAP and EFM. In 1988, during an overseas tour
by the Navy Inspector General and the Fleet Master Chiefs,
overseas commanding officers made numerous complaints about
service members/family members being sent overseas improperly
screened and/or not qualified for overseas duty, indicating
that they were not satisfied with the screening program and
that problems still existed. In response, the Chief of Naval
Personnel directed that a task force be convened to study
overseas screening problems under the direction of RADM R.W.
.?est, then Director of the Navy's Pride, Professionalism and
Personnel Excellence Department at NMPC.
The goals of RADM West's task force were two-fold. The
first goal was to educate the stateside commands conducting
screens about the problems overseas commands have with people
who should not have been sent overseas in the first place.
The second goal of the task force was to improve the
13
effectiveness of the relevant insLructions and screening forms
by adding provisions such as requiring the member's Commanding
Officer (or his officially designated representative) to sign
the screening form. The key members of the task force (Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery (MEDCOM-33), Family Services, Chief of
Naval Personnel (OP-13), NMPC-462, NMPC-40BB, and NMPC-662)
reviewed and considered all current procedures and directives.
The results of the task force were reported by RADM West
who stated,
"Deficiencies in application of the present
screening process have resulted in only a small
incidence of service member early returns (11 in
FY-86; 27 in FY-87). However, screening failures,
especially those involving dependents, are imposing
a burden on commands and on people who experience
difficulties overseas. The task force study and
deficiency reports from the field clearly show
three primary causes for errors: (1) improper (or
no) medical screening of member and/or dependents;
(2) lack of transferring command attention to
procedure; and, (3) insufficiently explicit
procedures and forms." [Ref. 6]
The changes made by this task force, such as including the
requirements for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) testing
and urinalysis screening, and a more in-depth medical screen,
were encompassed in the revised instruction, OPNAVINST
1300.14A, which lead to changes in all the other instructions
and forms that involve overseas assignment and screening.
In addition to the above mentioned changes and findings,
an "Effectiveness of Overseas Screening Policy' quarterly
report was designed and recommended for implementations;
however, there is no evidence available to suggest it was ever
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used. The document provided for reporting the number of
personnel transferred overseas, the number screened
unsuitable, waivers granted, total number of deficiency
reports and reasons for, total number of requests for early
return, and number returned with reasons why.
Apparently content with the changes to the screening
program and policies that were made by the 1988 task force,
Navy interest in this issue diminished until just recently.
Presently, the instructions concerned with overseas screening
are being revised once again, to include: more specifics on
FAP and EFM related questionz, requiring that accompanying
dependents and their medical/dental records be present during
the screen, the requirement for the establishment of a
screening coordinator with his/her signature as well as the
Commanding Officer's signature. These changes are mainly the
result of the perception, as learned through interviews by the
present researchers with NMPC personnel, that instances of
members/families being sent overseas with ongoing medical
conditions, financial problems, and family problems, have
increased over the past two years. This perception has been
strengthened by many recent messages received by NMPC-662,
NMPC-40BB, and NMPC-462 from overseas commands. David P.
Baine of the General Accounting Office summed up the current
feelings of overseas hospitals and dental clinics in a May
1990 Navy Times article. He stated, "Too many family members
arrive overseas with routine medical and dental conditions
15
that could have been taken care of before they left the United
States." [Ref. 71
Current interest in this issue on the part of both those
who administer the program, and the overseas commanding
officers, coupled with the fact that the most recent
assessment is ten years old, indicate a need for a current
analysis of the program. The result of this was the request




In order to determine the total number of early returns
from overseas commands, data had to be collected from several
different offices. NMPC-462, the office responsible for
tracking screening and screening deficiencies, provided data
that included: total numbers of overseas orders issued, total
number of members actually transferred overseas, number of
suitable screens reported, number screened unsuitable, total
number of deficiency reports received, and how many of those
were categorized as "major" or "minor" deficiencies.
NMPC-662, the Overseas Screening Office, provided
analyses of the data obtained from NMPC-462 and NMPC-40BB.
These statistics show the percentages of unsuitable screens by
several different categories, (such as FAP, financial, or
alcohol related problems), and the percentages of deficiency
reports in different categories, (such as EFM, medical or FAP
problems). Numbers provided to NMPC-662 by NMPC-40BB showed
the number of personnel returned at the request of an overseas
command. NMPC-662 also provided an estimate of the costs
associated with the 144 early returns identified by their
office.
Data obtained from NMPC-83, the Enlisted Performance
Division, showed, by month, the number of administrative
17
discharges issued throughout the entire Navy during the fiscal
year 1989. These were grouped into four areas, which included
misconduct, homosexuality, fraudulent enlistments, and
alcohol/drugs.
Data obtained from NMPC-84, who monitors and keeps
statistics of Navy personnel in all Navy overseas brigs showed
all the those confined during the study period, who were
either released to foreign authorities or returned to the
United States during the study period. The records indicated
the enlisted rank, as well as which overseas brig the person
was returned from.
The Armed Services Medical Regulating Office (ASMRO)
provided information concerning the total number of perscnnel
who were medically evacuated from overseas military treatment
facilities to the United States during the study period.
These records included all Fervices, and listed active duty
members, retirees and dependents. The records also indicated
whether a person was transported in an inpatient or outpatient
status. These records were reviewed to obtain only active
duty Navy and their dependents.
"Average Rotational Cost," a figure provided by NMPC, is
used in estimating the total average costs to the Navy of
early returns. This represents the costs of moving the
average Navy enlisted member and includes an average number of
dependents and an average amount of household goods back to
the United States, and then sending a replacement.
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B. PROCEDURES
The first task was to estimate the total number of early
returns from all of the areas listed above. The data provided
by NMPC-662 indicated those returned at the request of
overseas commands. In order to determine the number of early
returns due to ddministrative discharges, several assumptions
had to be made. Because no separate overseas data were
available from NMPC-83, the first assumption was that the
number of discharges from overseas, as a percentage of the
number of discharges Navy wide, would be approximately the
same as the number of personnel stationed overseas as a
percentage of total Navy enlisted. Approximately eight
percent (43,000 out of 508,000) of Navy enlisted personnel are
stationed overseas. Applying this percentage to the total
number discharged Navy-wide, gives an estimate of those early
returns due to administrative discharges.
Data from NMPC-84 proved easier to analyze. Records on
each member held in overseas Navy brigs showed the command
he/she was attached to at the time of offense, which command
he/she was released to, and their rank. A computer run of
only Navy enlisted personnel attached to overseas commands in
a Navy overseas brig was generate:. Those who were released
back to their overseas command or another overseas command
were deleted, and the remaining members are considered early
returns. Moct of these were released to stateside
correctional facilities.
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Estimating early returns resulting from medical
evacuations proved somewhat difficult. Microfiche data
obtained from ASMRO showed all active duty Navy and dependents
returned from overseas medical facilities. The records did
not indicate what command the member was attached to at the
time he/she was medevac'd, nor did they indicate whether the
member returned to his overseas command after being treated,
or remained in the states. In the case of dependents, it is
assumed that the reason they were at an overseas medical
facility is because their military sponsor was stationed
overseas, but records did not show whether the sponsor
accompanied the dependent back to the states and could
therefore be considered an earl: return. (It was pointed out
in the interviews with NMPC-662, however, that this does
happen often enough to be an issue.) Dependent returns were
therefore not included in the study. The number of active
duty medical early returns was therefore estimated in the
following manner:
Assuming that at any given time there are roughly 25,000
Navy personnel deployed over-qas (2-3 carrier battle groups,
2 reconnaissance aircraft squadrons, 2 Amphibious Ready
Groups), then one-third of the medevacs from overseas would
likely come from units based in the U.S. , and two-thirds would
be from overseas commands. In addition, if the nature of the
member's condition is such that the overseas medical facility
cannot treat it, the member's return represents at least a
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temporary loss to the command, and if the member cannot return
to overseas duty, a complete loss. This number, two-thirds of
all medevacs from overseas, is therefore considered to be a
conservative estimate of the early returns due to medical
reasons.
The total number of early returns is computed by adding
the numbers from the four separate areas. This number then
had to be analyzed to answer the second major question, i.e.,
how many of these personnel were returned for reasons that
could have been detected prior to sending them overseas, and
therefore represented failures of the screening process?
Statistics provided from NMPC-662 showed that of the 144
returns that were requested and approved by NMPC-40BB, 48 of
them, or one-third, were due to screening failures.
Because the screening records of those members who are
returned early due to administrative discharge, incarceration
or medical evacuation are not reviewed at the time they are
returned, they are not included in the numbers provided by
NMPC-662. It is assumed, therefore, that if they had been,
the same failure rate would apply, and one-third of them would
represent screening failures. This assumption is based on two
facts. First, there are questions regarding medical status,
performance, disciplinary history and criminal record on the
screening form, so that if a member is returned for a pre-
existing problem in one of these areas, it does represent a
problem that should have been detected during the screen.
21
Second, returns from these three areas (ones not requested
through NMPC-40BB), represent similar types of problems as
those returns that were requested, and therefore, the same
number are likely due to reasons that existed prior to being
transferred overseas. Review of the requested returns
indicated that this is true. Reasons listed included:
substance abuse (mainly alcohol) and disciplinary problems
similar to the type that could cause a member to either be
discharged or incarcerated, and medical problems that could
not be treated at the overseas medical facility, but that did
not require medical evacuation vi& ASMRO.
There are some differences, of course, between the
requested and non-requested returns. Some of the requested
returns were due to financial problems or family problems that
severely affected the member's ability to perform his/her job.
However, there were enough similarities among the reasons
listed to make the comparison of the two valid. The third
part of the analysis involves putting a cost on the issue.
The first estimate was obtained by simply multiplying the
number of estimated screening failures by the average
rotational cost. This is the method used in previous studies,
and is currently used by NMPC-662. This assumes, however,
that sending the member overseas, and then having to early
return him/her, was a complete loss, and that the Navy derived
no benefit at all from the member's presence overseas. This
may be true in the cases of members returned immediately upon,
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or soon after, arrival. The assumption becomes less valid,
though, the longer the member was overseas before being
returned (assuming the member was at least marginally
productive while he/her was overseas).
On the other hand, the longer a member remains overseas,
the more likely it is that his/her return would be for a
reason that originated overseas, and not a pre-existing
problem. Also, the closer a member gets to his/her planned
rotation date (PRD), the more likely they will be replaced
through normal procedures at the end of their tour. Taking
into account the fact that screening failures are considered
to have occurred during the first six months of the tour, a
second cost estimate was computed. (Six months is the cut-off
used by NMPC-662 in determining screening failures. Returns
occurring after a member has been in place for more than six
months are not considered screening failures).
By depreciating the "average rotational cost" over the
average tour length (36 months), an estimate can then be made
of the amount of loss associated with replacing members early.
For early returns occurring in the first month, a total loss
of the average rotational cost is assumed. After six months
the cost will have been depreciated by one-sixth (6/36). The
average of these two figures, (the full cost and the
depreciated cost), was used as an estimate of the amount of
loss of direct costs associated with the "average" early
return.
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A third estimate was also computed, based on information
found by Tucker in 1980 [Ref. 4]. In that study it was
determined that the average length of time served overseas
before being early returned was 13-18 months. It is assuming
again that the member was at least marginally productive while
overseas. Therefore, the Navy got the benefit of roughly half
a tour from the member, and the cost of replacing him/her
early only represents half the loss of replacing a member in
the first month of their tour.
These methods of estimating costs are extremely
conservative. They do not, for example, take into account the
many indirect costs associated with a member being returned
early, such as effects on morale of both the member and the
command, the hours spent by the command on administrative
matters concerning the return, loss of productive man-hours
from the member being returned, and, possibly, time lost while
the billet was not filled (if, for example a replacement was
not immediately available).
In addition to indirect costs, the number of dependents
returned for medical reasons represent possible screening
problems and additional unplanned costs to the Navy. While
they were not included in the estimated totals of early
returns and screening failures, there are substantial costs
associated with their return.
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C. JUSTIFICATION
Previous studies attempted to determine, on a case by
case basis, which returns were due to screening deficiencies.
As discussed earlier, this required the researchers to make a
judgement on each individual early return to determine if they
represented a screening failure. To do this, they had to have
not only access to each of those records, but also enough
expertise in the areas of administrative discharges,
incarcerations and medical evacuations to make their
judgements credible. After review of these previous studies,
it was unclear if that expertise was obtained.
Evaluation of individual cases for this thesis would have
been extremely difficult due to the current record keeping
practices of the above mentioned offices. In the first place,
all the data on specific overseas commands are not readily
available, and in the second place, in the cases where a
member was discharged from the service, individual records are
not maintained at NMPC, but are kept in Navy archives.
Therefore, the methodology described for this study is best
suited to the type of data that were provided. The statistical
techniques used here allow for meaningful estimates to be made
from the information that was obtained. In addition, the
methodology used here is not subject to the errors in
judgement that occur in case by case studies. While it is
acknowledged that there is a certain amount of error
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associated with any estimation, the effects of the errors in




Analysis of the data yielded several important findings.
To begin with, positive evidence that a screen had been
conducted on members sent overseas was reported in 16,500 out
of 17,775 cases, or 93%. This compares quite favorably with
the 57% found in 1980. The total estimated number of early
returns was 2366. While this is much higher than the figure
used by NMPC, it still represents less than 13.3% of all Navy
enlisted personnel ordered overseas during the year. The
total estimated number of returns due to reasons that could
have been detected prior to going overseas, was 789. This
means that an estimated 4.4% of those sent overseas in 1989
were returned because of a screening failure. This is
approximately four times as high as the number currently used
by NMPC-662.
Estimates of the number of early returns from overseas
and the number of those that were potential screening failures
is given in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1
SUMMARY OF EARLY RETURNS AND SCREENING FAILURES FOR FY89






Source: Estimated from data provided by NMPC sources.
Information provided by the Overseas Screening Office
(NMPC-662) showed 144 personnel were returned prior to the
completion of their overseas tour, as the result of a request
by the member's overseas command. Of these, 48 were
determined to be for reasons that could have been detected
prior to sending the member overseas. Reasons for return were
broken down in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2
















Data obtained from NMPC-83 showed that the total number
of administrative discharges for the entire Navy in FY89 was
15,573. Of this number, eight percent, or 1246, were
estimated to have come from overseas commands. The reasons
for discharge were grouped into five categories and are
displayed in Table 4.3. One third of 1246, or 415, are
potential screening failures.
TABLE 4.3
SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES IN FY89
Category Number Percentage
Fraudulent Enlistment 20 .016
Homosexuality 37 .030
Alcohol Abuse 15 .012
Misconduct 1173 .941
Best Interest of Navy 1 .001
TOTAL 1246 1.00
Source: Estimated from data provided by NMPC-83.
NMPC-84 showed that 839 Navy enlisted personnel were held
in overseas brigs during FY89. This was first narrowed down
to just those who were stationed at overseas commands or on
forward deployed ships at the time of confinement. Of those,
members released back to their original command were
discarded, as were members released to other overseas shore
facilities such as Transient Personnel Units. It is not known
whether members released to this type of facility were later
returned to the U.S., or were merely awaiting +he opportunity
to return to their original command (as often happens when the
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member's ship is at sea at the time he/she is released from
confinement). This left 128 individuals who were stationed
overseas, confined overseas, and released either to a
stateside brig or to foreign authorities. These are early
returns, and one third of them, or 43, were potential
screening failures. The breakdown of these personnel by
overseas brig and rank is shown in Table 4.4. These results
showed that the most early returns come from the Navy brigs in
Rota, Spain, and Yokosuka, Japan. This is not surprising due
to the fact that these two areas represent the largest
concentrations of Navy personnel overseas.
The highest number of returns, 36 (28 percent) were from
the rank of E2. Additionally, of all brig related returns, 64
percent were from the rank of El-E3. This is
disproportionately high when it is noted that the ranks of




SUMMARY OF EARLY RETURNS FROM OVERSEAS NAVY BRIGS
Brig El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 TOTAL PERCENT
Roosevelt
Roads, P.R. 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 8 6
Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2
Yokosuka,
Japan 7 11 9 7 3 3 1 41 32
Guam 2 2 0 1 3 0 0 8 6
Subic Bay,
R.P. 2 6 2 2 3 0 0 15 12
Rota, Spain 12 14 9 I0 6 2 1 54 42
TOTAL 24 36 22 22 16 5 3 128 100%
PERCENT 19 28 17 17 13 4 2 100%
Source: Adapted from data provided by NMPC-84.
Analysis of the data obtained from ASMRO yielded the
following results: There were 3488 Navy active duty personnel
and their dependents transferred from overseas medical
treatment facilities to stateside medical facilities in FY89.
55 of these were "non-medical attendants", and were discarded
from the sample, as there was nothing to indicate that they
did not return overseas. 2023 were active duty personnel
transported in an outpatient basis, and as they were assumed
to have returned to their overseas command, they were also
discarded from the sample.
145 of the patients transported were dependents of active
duty personnel in an inpatient status. Because it was not
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evident whether the dependent was accompanied by his/her
military sponsor, these were not included in the sample of
those early returned. The remaining 1265 were active duty,
Navy enlisted personnel transported to the U.S. in an
inpatient status. Assuming that approximately one third of
these were members on deployment on ships/units homeported in
the U.S., the other two thirds, or 848, are assumed to have
come from overseas commands. Because the nature of these
members' conditions was serious enough to warrant being
transported in an inpatient status, they are assumed to be
early returns. One third of this number, or 283, represent
potential screening failures.
The three cost computations are shown below.
1. Assuming total loss:
A. Average Rotational Cost .............. $11,000
x
Total Early Returns ................... 2366
$26,026,000
B. Average Rotational Cost ............... $11,000
x
Total Screening Failures .................. 789
$8,679,000
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2. Assuming All Screening Failures Occur In Six
Months:
Average Rotational Cost
((11,000 + 9167)/2) ..................... $10,083
x
Total Screening Failures .................... 789
$7,955,487
3. Assuming The Average Screening Failure Occurred At
18 Months:
Average Rotational Cost (11,000/2) ........... $5500
X
Total Screening Failures ....................... 789
$4,339,500
From these figures it is obvious that even the most
conservative estimate of costs is much higher than the cost
figures used by NMPC-662 for early returns and screening
failures, (approximately $2 million and $274,000,
respectively). The cost figures are even more conservative
when it is considered that they do not take into account the
number of medically transported outpatients and dependents
that may have resulted in the early return of a service
member, nor do they include any estimate of the indirect costs




The Overseas Screening Program is, by any standards, a
very successful program. 92 percent of those sent overseas
were found to have been screened, which is higher than at any
time in the last 15 years. (The status of the eight percent
that were not reported is unknown. ) Documented cases of
screening failures are extremely low, representing less than
one percent of those sent overseas, and while it has been
shown that this number understates the extent of the problem,
the screening failure rate estimated in this research Is still
less than five percent.
The highest number of potential screening failures, 415,
come from the category of administrative discharges, of which
94 percent were related to misconduct. This category, along
with those who were incarcerated (the more extreme cases of
misconduct), represent approximately 59 percent of all
potential screening failures. This suggests that stricter
screening procedures concerning performance history, military
and civilian criminal records is warranted.
No single office at NMPC has complete knowledge of all
early returns and potential screening failures. This is in
spite of recommendations made in 1974 [Ref. 2] and again in
1980 [Ref. 4] that the information be centralized and
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computerized for easy access by the Overseas Screening Office.
There are currently no procedures for the offices of NMPC-83,
NMPC-84, or MEDCOM (who should be reporting those returned via
ASMRO), to notify those in charge of overseas screening when
a member is early returned. This prevents NMPC-662 from being
able to determine whether those early returns were due to a
screening deficiency.
The six month cut-off used by NMPC-462 to determine
screening failures is not supported by past research or
current instructions. A member may be returned at any time
during his/her tour, and any early return represents a
potential screening failure. Because those who last beyond
the sixth month are not considered, many potential screening
failures are not included in the figures reported by
NMPC-662.
The costs associated with early returns, as currently
estimated by NMPC-662, are greatly underestimated. The $2
million figure they use could actually be as high as $26
million. The costs of potential screening failures could be
as high as $8.7 million. This is calculated using the same
computation method as that used by NMPC-662, which does not
take into account any productive time contributed by the
member before being returned. Even if the assumption is made
that the average member is productive for 18 months before
being returned, the costs could still be as high as $4.3
million for screening failures. This is again much higher
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than the numbers reported by NMPC-662. Both of these methods
are understated to the extent that they ignore the many
indirect costs associated with early returns. Although many
of the indirect costs are identifiable, they are difficult to
estimate accurately, and may actually be higher than the
direct costs.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Have NMPC-462, NMPC-40BB, NMPC-83, NMPC-84, and
MEDCOM-33 (Patient Administration Division), report all
relevant information and data to NMPC-662. This will give
NMPC-662 the ability to generate accurate numbers, (the kind
mentioned earlier in this paper). Two steps need to be taken
to ensure that this happens.
The first step would require that quarterly reports from
each of those offices be submitted to NMPC-662. These would
include numbers of screening deficiencies (from NMPC-462),
approved and disapproved early return requests (from NMPC-
40BB), and all early returns of both members and dependents
(from NMPC-83, NMPC-84, and MEDCOM).
The second step is easier to accomplish, and simply
requires that NMPC-662 be included in the distribution of
messages concerning early returns from NMPC-83, NMPC-84, and
MEDCOM. This would make it possible for NMPC-662 to evaluate
each early return, and through a review of the individual's
36
screening records and service record, determine if a screening
failure occurred.
These two items would put the ability to determine the
overall effectiveness of the policy in the hands of one
office. This office would then be able to coordinate the
efforts of all concerned in ensuring that the program is
carried out the way it should be; they would also be able to
focus on current issues that are affecting people in today's
Navy; and they would be able to compute the actual costs and
benefits involved and thereby quantitatively justify the
program's existence. The costs of these two actions would
simply be those associated with the collection of existing
data.
2. Examine more closely the reasons behind all early
returns, with specific emphasis on possible problem areas that
are not addressed by the screening instructions or forms. The
forms and instructions have been revised in the past. Two
examples of this were: (1) adding the requirement for the
approval of a Family Advocacy representative to the form, when
it was felt that family related problems were on the increase,
and (2) adding an HIV test to the required medical procedures
after AIDS became an issue. Both of these revisions, however,
were the result of distinctly non-scientific methods.
Empirical data analysis would provide a better indication of
the most common reasons for return, and would allow NMPC to
better focus their corrective actions on those problems.
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3. Examine documented cases where the system failed to
determine which commands are responsible for the majority of
screening problems and deficiencies. This information could
then be used to focus attention on those commands, possibly
conducting additional training with them to help improve their
record. This information would be available in the quarterly
reports discussed above. To put teeth into this, NMPC could
consider making the command that conducted the faulty screen
responsible for the costs of returning the member. Benefits
would accrue to the Navy as screening failures would likely be
decreased.
4. Hold service members accountable for all information
they are required to provide. In a 1988 message to all Navy
commands, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) stated that
"service members must be counseled regarding their
responsibility to disclose all information bearing on overseas
suitability and warned that failure to do so may result in
personal hardship and/or disciplinary action." [Ref. 3]
Interviews with senior personnel in NMPC-662 indicated that
members are rarely, if ever, disciplined for failing to
disclose relevant information. To strengthen the CNO's order,
the Navy should consider making members responsible for some,
if not all, of the costs associated with their early return,
when it is determined that the return was for a reason that
could have been detected had the member truthfully supplied
all the required information. With consistent enforcement
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this would result in increased accuracy of the information on
the screening forms and reduced numbers of early returns.
5. Make the screening requirements for E-3's and below
stricter, with increased emphasis on their entrance documents,
including recent civilian history. Of those held in overseas
Navy brigs, 64 percent were E-3 and below. This is a
disproportionately high number for a group that only makes up
33 percent of the Navy enlisted force. If it is assumed that
E-3's and below are similarly represented in the numbers of
administrative discharges due to misconduct, then there are a
very high number of first term personnel being returned.
There are at least two possible reasons for this. First,
these members most likely received orders overseas while
undergoing initial training. Because of this, any overseas
screen done on them would have had little Navy
performance/disciplinary documentation to review. Second,
members who receive orders overseas during initial training
are screened by that training command. Many attend follow-on
schools, which may delay their actually going overseas by
several months. In these cases, a member's screening status
and suitability for overseas assignment may have changed
between the time the member was screened and the time he/she
reported for overseas duty.
The screening procedure must examine a full year of
performance, and in the case of most first-termers it is
necessary to review civilian records to accomplish this. In
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addition, in those cases where a member attends follow-on
schools, screening requirements should be changed so that a
member is screened closer to the time he/she actually goes
overseas.
6. Have NMPC-662 incorporate into their organizational
plan both strategic and operational goals for the Overseas
Screening Program that are achievable and tangible in nature.
These should include, at least, (1) the frequency with which
the data must be collected for reporting purposes, and (2)
determining desired annual percentage reductions in costs,
discrepancies, and early returns from the previous year. This
would provide measures of effectiveness for the program,
would provide continuity to the program as personnel transfer
in and out, and would allow observers from outside the program
to quickly assess the overall performance of the Overseas
Screening Program.
When overseas screening is done correctly, the benefits
are apparent to the member, his/her potential overseas
command, and the Navy in general. The obvious benefits
include reduced member/family upheaval, reduced administrative
burdens, and substantial cost savings. By implementing the
above recommendations, the Overseas Screening Policy will be
stronger, more successful, and more responsive to the needs of
the Navy. Additionally, if these recommendations are adhered
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to, the Overseas Screening office will be able to measure
thzir own p:!rfc--nancc, cuilx faitle- bLudies such as this on=
will not be necessary.
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